

SECRET

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC 04547-86  
1 October 1986

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Graham E. Fuller  
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT: First Meeting of the Policy Intelligence Review Group (PIRG)

1. On 30 September the newly constituted Policy Intelligence Review Group (PIRG) held its first meeting. This group was established in August resulting from discussions between VC/NIC, Graham E. Fuller, and the DDCI. Its purpose is to periodically review the intelligence/policy relationship to insure that: (a) we get feedback on our product and market our current efforts more aggressively; (b) we get suggestions from the policy community on issues we can profitably examine; and (c) examine major "disconnects" between the intelligence and policy communities' views of a problem, i.e., where does policy seem to be moving in directions at odds with intelligence.

2. The first meeting was a success in that all participants agreed that the exercise was important, useful, and should be continued. Present at this meeting were C/NIC, Brig Gen Barry Horton; VC/NIC, Graham E. Fuller; Dick Solomon, Director of Policy Planning, Peter Rodman, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Foreign Policy); and Darnell Whitt representing Rich Armitage from DoD. The group agreed that "disconnects" were evident from time to time between the two communities, and need to be explored. We agreed the disconnects can arise from a variety of reasons -- differing priorities or agenda, a belief that once the warning function is established the problem is manageable, etc. The problem of limited financial resources can also affect policy responsiveness to a question, but we agreed that community ideas on low-resource policy alternatives would be helpful. The group strongly agreed that it is important to review these areas regularly, to try to reach some adequate explanation of why the apparent "disconnects" are present, and to monitor them over the course of time.

3. At this meeting three regional areas were represented:

- NIO/EA, Carl Ford, reviewed the Philippine situation, describing the degree of pessimism on the part of the analytic community that the insurgency could be turned around. Carl emphasized the need

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

for the US to treat the problem at the grass-roots level to stop the current deterioration of the situation in the countryside. Handling the program "at the top" of the Philippine government will not do the necessary. Rodman, Solomon, and Darnell clearly took on board the degree of concern felt by the intelligence community, and will look further at the issue. C/NIC will query Mike Armacost specifically on the value of the last Philippines estimate for the Aquino visit.

- A/NIO/EUR, [ ] discussed the delicate political situation in Poland and particularly [ ] the freedom of action which Abu Nidal employs in Poland and East Germany. [ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] Bennett also described the Yugoslav economic crisis and indicated that the crunch was probably coming much faster than the policy community seemed to realize.

- Graham Fuller, speaking on behalf of NIO/NESA, Daniel Webster, raised four issues:
  - The possible impending crisis springing from the upcoming Iranian "final assault." He particularly pointed out the dilemma of focussing policy energy on blunting the Iranian assault without considering when and how the US could make moves to gain some measure of influence with the Iranian regime and forestall Soviet influence there. Everyone agreed the problem was extremely difficult and that the problem of improving US-Iranian relations must be under review constantly throughout the war.
  - Counterterrorism vs. regional interests. While counterterrorism is an important aspect of US policy and has had some successes, there is a potential "disconnect" between those who focus on terrorism and those who work the regional issues. Better attention needs to be paid to assessing the relative weight of US interests at stake between counterterrorism or regional policies at any given time and the tradeoffs involved.
  - The Egypt debt crisis. Events since the last SNIE on Egypt indicate that the debt crisis continues to move in a negative direction anticipated by the Estimate and could pose a more broadly explosive problem for the US and Egypt.
  - Tunisia. Events in Tunisia were deteriorating at a slightly faster pace than the gloomy assessment portrayed in the Estimate of several months ago.

SECRET


4. Solomon asked that the community take a look at the following issues:

- Indochina: Are there new strains emerging in the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship? Are there opportunities for the US in improving ties with Vietnam? Is there room for work with the PRC in encouraging Vietnam toward reducing ties with the USSR?
- South Korea: Some kind of watch group should be established to monitor any possible deterioration in Chun's position. Such a group should be mindful of experience gained from managing the collapse of Marcos if things should seriously deteriorate in Seoul.
- Gorbachev's control: Solomon had the increasing impression that Gorbachev may be losing control over the many fast-breaking elements within the Soviet society. The implications of the Vladivostok speech may suggest military unhappiness with the leadership. The KGB role in the Daniloff affair may also suggest lack of coordination there. Does Gorbachev want a summit primarily to bolster his position internally?
- Does the new opposition party in Taiwan portend any major new shifts toward Taiwan flexibility toward China?
- South Africa: As the internal situation moves toward increased violence in the year to come, does the US have any options in working with other elements of that society?

5. Rodman and Whitt also ticked off other issues on their minds: Sudan, the Gulf war, Nicaragua, Costa Rican vulnerability, and Angola.

6. Graham Fuller also raised the broader problem of southern Africa. He suggested that we may need to view the entire South African situation as a single strategic whole rather than as the three traditionally separate problems: (a) South Africa; (b) US policy toward Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique; (c) our ties with Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Zaire. Polarization of the South African question could lead to crystallization of a common need for security by all the confrontation states -- that only the USSR could supply. The US would, therefore, lose out both in South Africa and in the confrontation states. This issue will be explored further when NIO/AF returns.

7. The members of the group agreed that Richard Perle's office should be represented at future meetings. The group can be further enlarged down the road as we see a need, but we do not wish the group to become unwieldy. It will continue to focus on conceptualization of policy/intelligence "disconnects," policy requirements, and product feedback. It will avoid becoming a working group on given problems. The next meeting will take place in about two months time.

  
Graham E. Fuller

SECRET

NIC 04547-86  
1 October 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: First Meeting of the Policy Intelligence Review Group (PIRG)

NIC/VC/NIC:GEFuller:jcn

1 October 1986



25X1

Distribution:

- 1 - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - D/Exec Staff
- 1 - ER
- 1 - C/NIC
- 1 - NIO/EA
- 1 - NIO/NESA
- 1 - A/NIO/EUR
- 1 - DDI Registry
- 1 - VC/NIC Chrono

SECRET